Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade of Agricultural Products. Evidence for Latin America

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Motivation

- Global progressive tightening and harmonization of IP protection systems, especially since the signing of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement in 1995
- In particular, developing countries are adopting stronger systems of IPRs and the TRIPS demanded protection of plant varieties and other sectors which were usually excluded from IP protection
- Empirical study of the effect of strengthening IP protection generated by the TRIPS

How are IPRs and Trade Related?

- Net effect on trade of increasing IPRs not clear
- Theoretically, Maskus and Penubarti (1995) have argued that there are different and contradictory effects
- If IP protection increases in country A:
 - Market Expansion Effect: Should encourage firms to export more since this reduces the risk of imitation
 - Market Power Effect: The market power that the importing firm earns, may induce her to behave in a monopolistic way, increasing prices and reducing sales
- Necessity of empirical analysis

Objectives

- Using data of agricultural trade exports and an index of IP protection for plant varieties, we explore the effect of the strengthening of IP on:
 - Trade Volumes
 - Bilateral Trade Links
- For 60 countries (29 DCs, 31 LDCs, and 14 LA) for the post-TRIPS period: 1995-2011

IPRs and Total Trade

Data

Total Trade of Agricultural Products: HS Commodity Classification, sectors a to 24, excluding fishery (3 and 16): agricultural products and animal products and food that use vegetable products as inputs

- Control Variables
 - Index of IP Protection
 - GDP per capita
 - Remoteness: weighted by the GDP
 - Openness to Trade
 - Human Capital: years of schooling for population over 15 years old

Model

$$\log(\operatorname{texpa}_i(t)) = x_i(t) \cdot \beta + \mu_i(t) ; \qquad (1)$$

 $x_i = \{1, \mathsf{inda}_i, \mathsf{log}(\mathsf{gdppc}_i), \mathsf{hc}_i, \mathsf{log}(\mathsf{remot}_i), \mathsf{log}(\mathsf{open}_i)\}$ (2)

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Total Agricultural Exports. Fixed Effects Estimations

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sample	FS	DC	LDC	LA
IP Index	0.015	-0.031	0.001	0.015
	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.027)
log GDP per capita	0.228***	0.784***	-0.012	-0.366**
	(0.074)	(0.119)	(0.095)	(0.154)
human capital	0.505***	-0.034	1.111***	1.153***
	(0.126)	(0.161)	(0.186)	(0.245)
log remotness	1.421***	2.311***	0.593	4.324***
	(0.332)	(0.481)	(0.447)	(1.091)
log openness	1.062***	1.061***	1.015***	0.705***
	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.072)
constant	-7.717***	-19.180***	0.466	-28.650***
	(2.895)	(4.183)	(3.924)	(8.818)
Observations	1,020	493	527	238
R-squared	0.837	0.871	0.825	0.867
Number of countries	60	29	31	14

Notes: Dependent variable: log of total exports of the agricultural sector. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

IP Index Coefficients. Sub-sectors. Fixed Effects Estimations

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sample	FS	DC	LDC	LA
1 Live Animals	0.080	0.009	0.151	0.153
	(0.067)	(0.0611)	(0.105)	(0.208)
2 Meat and Edible Meat Offal	0.156***	-0.136**	0.244***	-0.047
	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.091)	(0.168)
4 Dairy, Eggs, Honey, and Edible Products	0.282***	0.096***	0.344***	0.213*
	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.064)	(0.120)
5 Products of Animal Origin	-0.004	0.012	0.033	0.034
	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.068)	(0.118)
6 Live Trees and Other Plants	0.075**	-0.050	0.116**	0.246***
	(0.037)	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.089)
7 Edible Vegetables	0.010	-0.104***	0.064	0.178***
	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.065)
8 Edible Fruits and Nuts, Peel of Citrus/Melons	-0.038	-0.007	-0.069*	-0.050
	(0.028)	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.059)
9 Coffee, Tea, Mate and Spices	-0.085**	-0.153***	-0.080*	-0.142**
	(0.036)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.061)
10 Cereals	0.142*	0.059	0.086	0.127
	(0.074)	(0.094)	(0.111)	(0.177)
11 Milling Industry Products	0.044	0.066	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.052)	(0.064)	(0.078)	(0.109)

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IPRs and Trade

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IP Index Coefficients. Sub-sectors. Fixed Effects Estimations

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Sample	FS	DC	LDC	LA
12 Oil Seeds/Misc. Grains/Med. Plants/Straw	0.113***	0.074	0.073	0.272**
	(0.038)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.113)
13 Lac, Gums, Resins, etc.	-0.047	0.173**	0.031	-0.095
	(0.049)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.120)
14 Vegetable Planting Materials	-0.190***	-0.217**	0.214***	0.119
	(0.062)	(0.103)	(0.082)	(0.148)
15 Animal or Vegetable Fats, Oils and Waxes	0.035	0.007	0.049	0.339***
	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.069)
17 Sugars and Sugar Confectionery	0.122***	0.112**	0.046	-0.060
	(0.040)	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.079)
18 Cocoa and Cocoa Preparations	0.087**	0.172***	0.074	-0.172**
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.069)	(0.083)
19 Preps. of Cereals, Flour, Starch or Milk	0.137***	0.041	0.190***	0.098
	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.089)
20 Preps. of Vegetables, Fruits, Nuts, etc.	-0.085***	-0.151***	-0.028	0.038
	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.038)
21 Misc. Edible Preparations	0.082**	0.008	0.117**	0.219***
	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.051)	(0.068)
22 Beverages, Spirits and Vinegar	0.025	-0.033	0.046	0.018
	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.078)
23 Residues from Food Industries, Animal Feed	0.031	-0.005	0.002	0.196**
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.062)	(0.088)
24 Tobacco and Manuf. Tobacco Substitutes	0.037	0.143	-0.038	0.027
	(0.060)	(0.094)	(0.080)	(0.102)

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Bilateral Trade Links and IPRs

Intensive Margin

Extensive Margin

We use a Gravity Model:

$$W_{ij,k} = \exp\{x_{ij} \cdot \beta_k\} \eta_{ij,k},\tag{3}$$

 $x_{ij} = \{ \log(Y_i), \log(Y_j), \log(X_i), \log(X_j), Z_i, Z_j, d_{ij}, D_{ij} \};$

- W_{ij,k} is the export from country i to country j, in sector k
- Y_i is the annual GDP
- d_{ij} the geographical distance

- $\blacktriangleright X_i = \{AREA_i, POP_i\}$
- D_{ij} = {contig,comlang_off, comcol, colony} barriers to trade
- \triangleright $Z_i = \{ | and |, IP | Index \}$

Variable Details

Gravity Model Estimation

Sample		FS			LA	
Model	FE	PPML	Logit	FE	PPML	Logit
IP Index_e	0.002	-0.001	-0.032*	-0.048**	-0.388***	-0.301***
	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.056)	(0.060)
IP Index_i	-0.081***	0.020	0.307***	-0.076***	0.259***	0.246***
	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.045)	(0.043)
log GDP_e	1.146***	0.807***	1.391***	0.388***	0.680***	- 0.935 ***
	(0.038)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.100)	(0.080)	(0.124)
log GDP_i	1.642***	1.002***	1.023***	2.217***	0.780***	1.583***
	(0.036)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.092)	(0.039)	(0.044)
log POP_e	-0.576***	-0.261***	-0.622***	1.133***	-0.862***	0.506***
	(0.097)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.320)	(0.102)	(0.138)
l₀g POP_i	-0.300***	- 0.175 ***	-0.607***	-0.025	0.150***	-1.191***
	(0.095)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.225)	(0.049)	(0.055)
log AREA_e		0.062***	0.203***		0.851***	1.052***
		(0.011)	(0.012)		(0.040)	(0.052)
log AREA_i		-0.150***	-0.018		-0.125***	0.027
		(0.010	(0.012)		(0.025)	(0.035)
Land-locked e		-0.819***	-0.619***		-1.036***	-4.068***
		(0.035)	(0.032)		(0.121)	(0.165)
Land-locked_i		-0.516***	-0.149***		-0.398***	-0.792***
		(0.036)	(0.036)		(0.057)	(0.076)
log Distance		0.561***	-0.857***		0.654***	1.354***
		(0.017)	(0.019)		(0.053)	(0.090)
Contiguity		0.931***	1.143***		0.805 ***	
		(0.046)	(0.236)		(0.090)	
Common Language		0.187***	1.515***		0.080	0.508***
		(0.041)	(0.094)		(0.076)	(0.140)
Common Colonizer		0.271***	2.075***		-2.949***	0.878
		(0.085)	(0.120)		(0.344)	(0.611)
Colony		-0.025	0.375		0.376***	
		(0.036)	(0.276)		(0.101)	
T ime -d u m mies		yes	yes		yes	yes
Constant	yes			yes		
Observations	61,129	70,720	70,720	13,241	15,232	14,331

Intensive Margin: PPML & FE

Using total bilateral exports

Extensive Margin: Logit

Using bilateral trade relationships

Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

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Full Sample Evidence

- Trade volumes are unaffected by IPRs
- The extensive margin is positively affected by IPRs

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Latin American Evidence

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 Exporters' and importers' IPRs lead to opposite effects on both trade margins

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IPR-Effects on Sub-sectors' Trade: LA exports



Sector Intensive Margin

- The net-effect on trade volumes due to the exporters' and the importers' IPRs is quite sector specific.
- In just one sector (HS=6) the net effect of strong IPRs is expected to promote LA exports

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Sector Extensive Margin

 Stronger IPRs in LA countries are expected to limit their possibilities of opening new markets

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General Conclusions

- ► Trade Volume and IPRs
 - The increase in IPRs after the signing of the TRIPS does not have a significant effect on trade volumes of agricultural products
 - The results are robust when considering samples restricted to different development levels and Latin American countries
 - For more disaggregated level of products, we found different correlations between trade volumes and the index of IP protection
- Bilateral Trade Links and IPRs
 - Stronger IPRs in the LA countries limit have a negative effect on the creation of trade links
 - LA countries may benefit from stronger IPRs systems in other countries
- The fact that the exporter's level of IP protection has a negative effect, especially in developing countries may be due to the fact that IPRs are affecting negatively productivity, innovation activities and competitiveness of these countries
- This provides evidence against the idea that there is a unique system of IP protection that fit equally all countries

Thank you!

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List of Variables. Gravity Model

Label	Description	Source
W	Imports in U.S. Dollars by sectors	BACI-CEPII
open	Openness to Trade	Penn World Table
GDP	Gross-domestic product	Penn World Table
area	Country area in Km ²	
рор	Country population	CEPII
P ndex	Index of IP protection for Plant Varieties	Campi and Nuvolari (2013)
hc	Index of human capital per person	Penn World Table
remot	Remoteness	Melitz (2007)
d	Distance between two countries, based on bilateral distances between the largest cities of those two countries, weighted by the share of the city in the overall country's population	CEPII
an d	Dummy variable equal to 1 for landlocked Countries	CEPII
contig	Contiguity dummy equal to 1 if two countries share a com- mon border	CEPII
comlang_off	Dummy equal to 1 if both countries share a common official language	CEPII
comcol	Dummy equal to 1 if both countries have had a common colonizer	CEPII
colony	Dummy equal to 1 if both countries have ever had a colonial link	CEPII

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IPRs and Trade

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